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I. INTRODUCTION
A. TheoreticalFramework
The legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq has been the subject of
extensive scholarly attention.' The jus in bello of the Iraq War, on the
other hand, has received comparatively less scholarly interest, 2
especially with regard to the manner and degree to which the United
States-the de facto occupying power in Iraq-adhered to its
responsibilities under the international law of occupation.3 Although the
media,4 and even governments, 5 played an important role during the
1. E.g., Andru E. Wall, Was the 2003 Invasion ofIraq Legal?, in 86 INT'L LAw STUDIES,
THE WAR IN IRAQ: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 69-80 (Raul A. Pedrozo ed., 2010); James D. Fry,
Remaining Valid: Security Council Resolutions, Textualism, and the Invasion of Iraq, 15 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 609 (2007); Tomasz Iwanek, The 2003 Invasion of Iraq: How the System
Failed, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 89 (2010); Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality ofInvading
Iraq, 92 GEo. L.J. 173 (2004); Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of
InternationalLaw: Hegemony or Pluralism?,25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691 (2004); Owen Bowcott,
Was the War Legal? Leading Lawyers Give Their Verdict, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2004, 3:28
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/02/uk.internationaleducationnews.
2. But see Christian Enemark, 'Non-Lethal' Weapons and the Occupation of Iraq:
Technology, Ethics andLaw, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 199(2008).

3. But see David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation
and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 121 (2005); Adam Roberts, Transformative
Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580
(2006); Marco Sass6li, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by
Occupying Powers, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 661 (2005); Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of
Occupationin the Wake of OperationIraqi "Freedom," 95 CALIF. L. REv. 2295 (2007); Dennis
Mandsager et al., Jus in Bello: Occupation Law and the War in Iraq, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PRoc. 117(2004).
4. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 197 n.5
(2005). The media examined various legal questions,
includ[ing] the proper role of the United Nations Security Council in
authorizing the war, prosecution of deposed Ba'ath Party leaders, alleged
torture of Iraqi detainees, misconduct by private contractors, the status of
United States and other foreign forces after the return of an Iraqi government,
the awarding of reconstruction contracts, and the protection (or lack thereof) of
Iraqi cultural heritage.
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early phases of the war by introducing and investigating important legal
issues relating to the occupation of Iraq, the critical legal questions
relating to the occupation of Iraq, including those pertaining to the
lawfulness of the reforms proposed and undertaken by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), the legal relationship between the CPA
and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), and the legal authority
exercised by both the CPA and IGC during the occupation of Iraq, have
yet to receive the same scholarly attention that scholars have paid to the
legal questions surrounding the resort to force itself.
In many respects, this lack of critical attention to the jus in bello
dimensions to the Iraq War is understandable, especially given the
horrific crimes committed by Saddam Hussein and the deplorable
standard of living that many in Iraq experienced as a result of Saddam's
policies. Indeed, very few individuals, reporters, or even government
officials felt inclined to question in any meaningful way the positive
reforms initiated by the U.S.-led coalition in post-Saddam Iraq.6 In
general, public opinion seemed to subscribe to the view that the United
States and the United Kingdom were liberators, not occupiers, perhaps
as a result of the U.S. authorities' deliberate avoidance of the term
"occupying power." 7 The United States "[had] come as liberators, not
occupiers," stated General Tommy Franks, commander of the coalition
forces, as U.S. forces entered Baghdad on April 9, 2003.'
Yet, from an academic perspective, the lack of serious attention
given by scholars and the media to the legal issues attendant to the U.S.
occupation of Iraq is perplexing, if not troubling. After all, the law of
occupation, despite being initially codified in 1907 in the Hague
Conventions, is a rather rudimentary, if not nascent, body of
international law, as very few states, during the time period from World
War II until the 2003 invasion of Iraq,9 acknowledged the applicability
Id.; Guy Gugliotta, Pentagon Was Told of Risk to Museums: U.S. Urged to Save Iraq'sHistoric
Artifacts, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/Al96912003Aprl3?language=printer; Jackie Spinner, Only Allies to Help with Rebuilding, US. to Deny
Contracts to Firmsfrom NonsupportingNations, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2003, at Al.
5.

Paul Bowers, IRAQ: LAW OF OCCUPATION (House of Commons Library Research

Paper No. 03/51, 2003), availableat http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RPO3-5 1.
6. Fox, supra note 4, at 197.
7. Id. In public use, the United States avoided the term "occupying power," but before
the United Nations and in the quasi-legal documents associated with the United Nations, the
United States acknowledged itself as being bound by all of the responsibilities attendant to
occupation. Roberts, supra note 3, at 609.
8. Id. See also Katherine Butler & Donald Macintyre, The Iraqi Conflict: General
Franks Strides into His Baghdad Palace, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 17, 2003, at 6
(quoting General Tommy Franks: "This has been about liberation, not about occupation.").
9. See S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) ("[R]ecognizing
the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of
[the United States and the United Kingdom] as occupying powers under unified command . . .").
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of occupation law to their respective occupational endeavors.'o This
lack of state practice prevented scholars and judges from further
refining the doctrine of occupation law, and, as a result, the law of
occupation in 2003 was, in a sense, ripe for molding.
Given its geopolitical importance and influence in the Westphalian"
system of international law and politics, the United States was
positioned to play a formidable role in shaping the contours of the law
of occupation, for better or worse. In addition, given the shadow of
illegality that hung over the actual invasion, one would have expected
that America's post-invasion objectives would have been much more
scrutinized, however innocuous they may have appeared at the outset.
That the United States insisted that it assume the lead in post-war Iraqexplicitly acknowledging itself as an occupying power subject to the
international law of occupation12 should have prompted scholars to
examine more closely the legal questions attendant to the choice to
occupy Iraq. This is especially true given the history and culture of Iraq,
which speak to the need for exercising caution in choosing whether to
occupy any part of the region, let alone in pursuing an overtly
transformational occupational agenda.'
More importantly, and casting aside for a moment General Franks
political platitudes, as a matter of law "there is no liberation law, only
occupation law."14 Indeed, as international law professor Yoram
10.

EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 4, 6 (1993) (most states

since 1907 have refused to officially adopt the moniker of "occupier" in their occupational
activities, and "[m]ost contemporary occupants ignored their status and their duties under the

law of occupation"); Jordan J. Paust, The United States as Occupying Power Over Portions of
Iraq and Special Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, I
(2003). See Fox, supra note 4, at 238-39 (the Israeli occupation of Palestine is one of the few

pre-2003 occupation cases acknowledged by the international community, though not by Israel
itself).
11.

DAVID MALAND, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 180 (1966). In 1648, the

treaties of Osnabriick and Monster-known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia-were
signed, concluding the wars of religion in 17th-century Europe and significantly altering the
system of international law and relations that had previously governed Europe. See generally D.
H. PENNINGTON, EUROPE INTHE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1989). Technically, fighting did not
stop in 1648, as France and Spain remained at war with each other until the signing of the
Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. Id. Prior to 1648, Europe was heavily influenced by tribal,
religious, ethnic, familial, feudal, and economic loyalties. Following the treaties of Westphalia,
these feudal-religious loyalties were subsumed by the "state system," in which the nation-state
emerged as a unitary, sovereign agent to which loyalty was obliged. Id. The result was the birth
of an international system in which non-intervention and territorial sovereignty emerged as
sacrosanct principles of international law. Id
12. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 9.
13.

E.g., CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ (2000).

14. Fox, supra note 4, at 198. See also Paust, supra note 10, at I ("[R]egardless of the
purpose of the overall mission, the United States is an occupying power with competencies and
responsibilities under the laws of war . . ."); Zahawi, supra note 3, at 2347 ("A state infringing

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss3/2
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Dinstein noted, from the day President George Bush infamously
declared an end to combat operations in Iraq, "the legal status [pursuant
to international law] of the Coalition Forces in Iraq [was] not that of
liberators but that of belligerent occupants." 5 Thus, regardless of why
the United States invaded Iraq, the question of how-legally speakingit would occupy Iraq was of utmost importance.
Some scholars have explored various aspects of the jus in bello
components of the Iraq war.16 Yet many of these studies limit their
utility insofar as they either (1) confine their analyses merely to the
relevance, or applicability, of the traditional law of occupation to
contemporary occupations, thereby truncating serious investigation
into the legal questions surrounding the occupation of Iraq, or (2) rely
solely on United States or CPA sources to substantiate claims that the
United States either adhered to or violated the law of occupation in its
occupation of Iraq.18
In an attempt to address these weaknesses in the existing literature,
this Article makes a distinctive contribution: it relies primarily on the
minutes kept and resolutions adopted by the IGC to examine the
relevance of occupation law to contemporary, state-building
occupations and, in turn, to determine the degree to which the United
States adhered to its responsibilities as the occupying power in Iraq.
Given that the entire purpose of the law of occupation is to protect and
uphold the human rights of the occupied population,1 it is only natural
that scholars examine the occupation of Iraq from the perspective of the
right-holders themselves-that is, in this case, the Iraqis, of whom the
IGC was the principal representative entity. The IGC was the quasigovernmental body established by the CPA in June 2003 and officially
recognized by the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 148320 and
on the sovereignty of another, regardless of the circumstances, is still legally an occupier and
must abide by occupation law.").
15. Yoram Dinstein, Jus in Bello Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003, 1 ISR.
Y.B. HuM. RTs. 12, 12 (2004) (quoted in Zahawi, supra note 3, at 2315).
16. E.g., Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
721 (2005); James Thuo Gathii, Foreignand OtherEconomic Rights Upon Conquestand Under
Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 491
(2004); Conor McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation:
Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURTY L. 43 (2005); David J.
Scheffer, Agora (Continued): FutureImplications of the Iraq Conflict: Beyond OccupationLaw,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842 (2003); John Yoo, IraqiReconstruction and the Law of Occupation, 11
U.C. DAVIS

17.

J.

INT'L L. & POL'Y 7 (2004).

E.g., Brett H. McGurk, Revisiting the Law ofNation-Building: Iraq in Transition, 45

VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (2005).

18.
19.
20.

E.g., Zahawi, supra note 3.
See infra Part II.
S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 9.
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1511.21 The IGC minutes and resolutions22 provide invaluable insights
into the occupation of Iraq during the period between July 13, 2003,
when the IGC was officially formed, and June 1, 2004, when the IGC
was dissolved and authority transferred by the CPA to the Iraqi Interim
Government.
Perhaps more importantly, the IGC minutes and resolutions offer
valuable insights into the important moral and philosophical questions
surrounding occupation in general: what is occupation and what laws
should govern occupation? Should transformative occupations be
permitted under international law? If so, what principles should govern
such laws? If not, how can "failed states" best be guided through the
necessary transformations into self-governing, sovereign states, while
simultaneously upholding human rights? These broader, theoretical
questions will be addressed in the context of the ensuing analysis.
Relying on the insights provided by the IGC minutes and
resolutions, this Article argues that the traditional law of occupation is
eminently relevant to contemporary, state-building occupations, and that
the United States exceeded liberal interpretations of occupation law in
its transformational agenda in Iraq. Extending the arguments of other
scholars, this Article also proposes modifications to the traditional law
of occupation that would enable states to more effectively balance the
tension between traditional occupation law and the realities of
contemporary, state-building occupations that require drastic
transformations to the economic, political, and legal infrastructure of the
occupied state. Specifically, this Article contributes to the growing body
of literature on the international legal doctrine of jus post bellum by
outlining three fundamental principles that must supplement the existing
proposals related to the jus post bellum law of transformative
occupations. Foremost among these principles is the necessity for the
preservation of popular sovereignty during transformative occupations
in the form of an executive council made up of elected citizen
representatives from the occupied state that have veto power over all
proposed reforms to the legal, economic, and political infrastructure of
21. See S.C. Res. 1511,14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003) ("Determines that the
Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim
administration . . .").
22. These resolutions, which number roughly 230, were obtained by Professor Stefan
Talmon of St. Anne's College, Oxford. Professor Talmon obtained the resolutions through the
assistance of a colleague in Baghdad, who located them in a local bookshop. STEFAN TALMON,
THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ, VOL. II: THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY, THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL AND RELATED DOCUMENTs (forthcoming 2012). As
an intern for Professor Talmon, the author translated these resolutions from Arabic into English.
With the assistance from Hamida Khalil, an Iraqi PhD. student in Political Science at the
University of Utah, the author also translated many of the minutes kept by the IGC in their
weekly meetings.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss3/2
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the occupied state.
B. Outline ofArticle
Part II examines the history and fundamental tenets of the traditional
law of occupation and its status under international law prior to the
2003 invasion of Iraq. Part III examines how the CPA's reforms
complied with the traditional law of occupation using the minutes and
resolutions of the IGC. Following a brief introduction to the IGC, its
establishment and envisioned authority, Part III presents key findings
from the resolutions adopted and minutes kept by the IGC to further and
more accurately demonstrate how the United States acted contrary to its
obligations under the international law of occupation during its
occupation of Iraq.
Scholars have argued that despite the CPA's apparent violations of
the law of occupation, the CPA reforms were nonetheless lawful under
international law, and several theories have been presented to this end.
Part IV outlines a few of the more prominent of these theories, and
concludes by critiquing several of their premises and conclusions. Once
again, the IGC minutes and resolutions provide unique insights.
Combining the conclusions from Parts II-IV, Part V proposes three
principles that must accompany a more practical international legal
standard for transformative occupations-a jus post bellum-against
which contemporary, transformative occupations can be measured.
II. THE TRADITIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION

A. HistoricalOverview
The international law of occupation emerged as a norm of customary
international law in the late eighteenth century in response to what was
previously the somewhat unencumbered state practice of conquering
and subjugating foreign territories.2 3 Prior to the late eighteenth century,
conquest was viewed by the community of nations as a legitimate tool
of statecraft, and states exercised almost absolute entitlement to the
spoils of conquest. 24 In practice, the assumption of control over
23.

See generally OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 432-33 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed.

1952); Fox, supra note 4, at 228-31 (providing a brief overview of the evolution of the law of
occupation prior to 1907); Jean L. Cohen, The Role of InternationalLaw in Post-Conflict
Constitution-Making: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for "Interim Occupations," 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 496, 503 (2007) ("[T]he concept of belligerent occupation was distinguished from the
older 'right of conquest' which ipso facto ascribed full sovereignty over conquered territory and
the total subjugation of its inhabitants--absolute dominion to the victor in a war.").
24.

SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST 109-11 (1996).
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conquered territory had devastating consequences for the conquered
territory, with "'rape and pillage' being the harsh but common
consequence of foreign control over territory." 25 The rise of standing
armies and more standardized codes of conduct in the nineteenth
century led to the emergence of international norms that limited the
excesses of conquest, thereby attempting to preserve the status quo ante
bellum in the conquered territory.2
The standardized codes of conduct relating to occupation were
initially categorized under the rubric of "belligerent occupation." The
concept of belligerent occupation "refers to the possession or control of
territory acquired under an occupation that is deemed provisional . . .
and thus involves temporary and limited prerogatives of administration
rather than outright sovereignty and, by implication, a special legal
status." 27 The first usage of the concept of "belligerent occupation" was
by a German publicist in 1844, although "[t]he original articulation of
the idea behind the modern concept of 'belligerent occupation' is
attributed to Emmerich de Vattel."2 8 The first codification of the law of
belligerent occupation was the Lieber Code, which was issued to Union
Forces on April 24, 1863 at President Lincoln's request, and which
addressed inter alia belligerent occupation.29
The limits on an occupier's powers that emerged in the nineteenth
century sought to delay the vesting of sovereignty to the occupying
power until its territorial rights were formalized, usually via a peace
treaty.3 0 The occupying power was "prohibited from engaging in certain
government activities deemed [to be) the legitimate prerogatives of the
then-still de jure sovereign regime." 1 Occupation was thus considered
to be a provisional custodianship of territory, or the temporary
assumption of certain governmental prerogatives, until full sovereignty
was returned to the de jure government or vested in the occupying
power itself under international approbation.
The international law of occupation continued to evolve during the
nineteenth century and was eventually codified in the 1907 Hague

25. See Fox, supra note 4, at 229.
26. Id.
27. Cohen, supra note 23, at 503. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 10, at 8 n.9; Daphna
Shraga, Military Occupation and UN Transitional Administrations--The Analogy and Its
Limitations, in PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH

INTERNATIONAL LAW 479, 481 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2007).
28. Id (quoting Dolus GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 1863-1914: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 14 (1949)).

29. Id. (quoting Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 239, 245 n.22 (2000)).
30. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828).
31. Fox, supra note 4, at 229.
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Regulations on Land Warfare. 32 Following World War II and the
subsequent brutal Nazi and Japanese occupations, the Hague
Regulations were substantially expanded in the Fourth Geneva
Convention33 and, later, in Additional Protocol I, adopted in 1977.34 The
provisions contained therein-including those pertaining to the
responsibilities and limits of the occupying power-are binding on
parties and non-parties to both treaties as customary international law.3 5
The concept of belligerent occupation fell somewhat into desuetude
during World War 11 and throughout the Cold War. 36 It was during the
transformative occupations of the latter that occupation law reached its
nadir.37 Because the occupations of the 1990s were administered by the
United Nations, occupation law remained in the background-that is,
until the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Combined with U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483, which recognized the United States and the United
Kingdom as occupying powers subject to the international law of
occupation, 39 the United States' explicit adoption of the moniker
occupying power revived the law of occupation in a poignant fashion.4 0
The development of the law of occupation can be seen as a branch of
international humanitarian law. 4 1 As Cohen notes: "Legal rules were
deemed necessary because the ousted sovereign no longer has the
ability to protect the local population; and the occupier, precisely
because his occupation is seen as temporary, has no interest in doing
so.'A 2
B. Occupation Law Defined: The ConservationistPrinciple
"Occupation" was defined in Article 42 of the Annex to the 1907
32. Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 88-89 (2003).
33. Id at 89.
34. Cohen, supra note 23, at 509.
35. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 257, 79 (July 8) ("These fundamental rules [of Hague and Geneva Law] are to be
observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them,
because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law."); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, T 89 (July 9) (holding that Israel is subject to the Hague Convention in
the occupied territories despite the fact that Israel is not a signatory to the Hague Convention).
36. See BENVENISTI, supra note 10, at 59-184.
37. Id.
38. See Cohen, supra note 23, at 499 n.6 ("U.N. Security Council sponsored interim
administrations are not to be subject to the law of belligerent occupation.").
39. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 9.
40. Cohen, supra note 23, at 499.
41. Id. at503.
42. Id. at 502.
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Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land: "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under
the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends .

.

. where

such authority has been established and can be exercised."4 3 The 1907
Hague Convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and Additional
Protocol I of 1977 outline the basic legal parameters to an occupying
power's authority. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in
his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
and safety, while respectin , unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country.
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention elaborated upon Article
43 of the Hague Regulation as follows:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force,
with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the
Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its
security or an obstacle to the application of the present
Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the
necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the
tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in
respect of all offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of
the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable
the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present
Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory,
and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the
members and property of the occupying forces or administration,
and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication
43. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of
Regulations art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the Geneva Civilian
Convention, along with Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (The Geneva Civilian Convention), has
reinforced and elaborated upon this definition. Paust, supra note 10, at 2. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) has reaffirmed the "effective control" test. Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
136, 78 (July 9) ("[T]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised.").
44. Hague Convention, supra note 43, art. 43.
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used by them. 45
The Fourth Geneva Convention specifically mentions the need for
the continuation of penal laws, while the Hague Regulations require the
occupying power to respect the laws in force in the country. Taken
together, these restrictions constitute what has come to be known as the
"conservationist principle." In general, the conservationist principle
stands for the proposition that the occupying power is prohibited from
instituting significant changes to the legal, political, economic, and
social institutions of the occupied state. Accordingly, the occupying
power "assumes only as much of the displaced sovereign's authority as
is necessary to administer the territory, but no more."47 Moreover,
[t]he occupying power is competent to legislate both to maintain
security while it exercises governing authority and to fulfill the
obligations under occupation law that secure basic rights for the
local population. But because the occupier possesses no local
legitimacy or necessary stake in the welfare of the territory after
it departs, it is not competent to enact reforms that fundamentally
alter governing structures in the territory and create long-term
consequences for the local population. 48
The United Nations has not elaborated on the legal obligations of
occupyinA powers, with two exceptions: The Israeli occupation of
Palestine and, to a degree, the U.S. occupation of Iraq.50 The
reluctance of occupying powers to acknowledge occupation law as
binding on them" has also hindered scholars' ability to determine the
precise contours of occupation law, as least as it pertains to
contemporary state practice.
The foundation of the conservationist principle is the concept of
"inalienability of sovereignty through the actual or threatened use of
force." 52 Indeed, the conservationist principle presumes that
"occupations are temporary, non-transformative, and limited in
scope."5 Thus, the "occupying competencies under the laws of war
45.
64, Aug.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
Cohen, supra note 23, at 498.
Fox, supra note 4, at 237.
Id. at 240.
See id. at 231.
See infra Parts III & V,
See BENVENISTI, supra note 10, at 6.

52. Id. at 4.
53. Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post
Bellum, Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 57, 61 (2009).
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(e.g., to arrest non-prisoners of war and to use force for law and order
purposes) are legally coextensive with the rights of individuals and the
general population under laws of war applicable during occupation." 54
Foremost among these rights are human rights, including the right of
protection from torture and cruel or inhumane treatment, due process
guarantees for those accused of a crime,5 6 freedom from collective
penalties,5 7 and access to food and health care services. 58 These rights
apply to all individuals under occupation, whether they are prisoners of
war (protected by the Third Geneva Convention) or civilians (protected
by the Fourth Convention).5 9
The conservationist principle also enjoins occupying powers and
private companies working under the auspices of an occupying power
from appropriating private and state-owned property,6 0 including natural
resources. Occupying powers and private companies therefore may
not "privatiz[e] oil or the state-owned oil production and distribution
industry and must not tolerate rates of extraction beyond prior 'normal'
rates of extraction or excessive fees or profits by others administering
such properties."6 2 Transformations to the economic infrastructure,
alteration of tax methods, abolition of the death penalty, and changes to
labor laws have also been condemned by the international community
as being violations of occupation law. 6 3
54. Paust, supra note 10, at 2.
55. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
56. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military
Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure,23 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 677, 678-79 (2002);
Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L. L.
1, 5, 12 (2001).
57. Paust, supra note 10, at 7. Article 50 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV
expressly affirms: "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the
population on account of acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and
severally responsible." Hague Convention, supra note 43, art. 50.
58. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 55, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art, 14(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I].
59. Cohen, supra note 23, at 510.
60. Hague Convention, supra note 43, art. 56; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 45,
arts. 46, 50.
61. See ICCPR, supra note 56, art. 1(2) ("All peoples may, for their own ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.").
62. Paust, supra note 10, at 12.
63. As noted by Fox, "the Israeli Supreme Court has upheld many such acts . . ." Fox,
supra note 4, at 239. The Security Council has nonetheless "unequivocally condemned Israel's
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Both Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention provide for exceptions to the conservationist
principle. These exceptions are for military necessity, preservation of
public order, and when needed to fulfill other obligations under the
convention. 64 All existing legislation is to be respected by the occupying
power unless, as outlined in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the
occupier is "absolutely prevented" from doing so. 65 Although such
exceptions have the potential to substantially alter daily life in the
occupied territory, the underlying goal of occupation law is to secure
stability and peace through preserving existing political and legal

institutions.6 6
III. IGC RECORDS AND THE CONSERVATIONIST PRINCIPLE

While the CPA6 7 orders and regulations alone cast doubt upon the
CPA's compliance with the conservationist principle,6 8 they are
incomplete insofar as they often fail to adequately account for the voice
introduction of its own laws into the territories and affirmed the application of the Fourth
Geneva Convention to its actions." Id. See also S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2203d
mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/465 (1980) (condemning as a "flagrant violation of the Geneva
Convention . . . all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic
composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories
occupied since 1967") (quoted in Fox, supra note 4, at 239 n.264).
64. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 45, art. 64.
65. Hague Convention, supranote 43, art. 43.
66. Id. at 237.
67. The precise origins of the CPA remain unclear. "[The CPA] was not created by any
specific act of U.S. or U.K. law, and a thorough study of its creation concluded that 'detailed
information that explicitly and clearly identifies how the authority was established, and by
whom, is not readily available."' Fox, supra note 4, at 203 (quoting L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 32370, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AuTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES 4 (2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/

documents/organization/32338.pdf).
68. Zahawi, supra note 3, at 2321-23. The CPA orders, although motivated by laudable
goals and bringing about many important economic, political, and legal reforms to Iraq,
nonetheless reveal a systematic disregard for the conservationist principle. Via its approximately
100 Orders, which covered an array of political, social, legal and economic matters and which
were issued over the course of the first year of the occupation of Iraq, the CPA sought to
"overhaul Iraq's existing criminal, economic, and civil legal systems," with the goal of
"transforming Iraq into a politically decentralized and economically liberal state." Id. at 2324.
See also Fox, supra note 4, at 240 ("A literal interpretation of article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, prohibiting change to the laws in force 'unless absolutely prevented' from doing
so, would likely find most of the CPA's reforms invalid."); Scheffer, supra note 16; see
generally Peter Galbraith, Iraq: The Bungled Transition, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Sept. 23, 2004,
http:www.nybooks.com/articles/17406/; Naomi Klein, Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in
Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia, HARPERS (Sept. 2004), http://www.harpers.org/BaghdadYearZero.
html.
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of the Iraqi people during the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Because the
underlying purpose of the law of occupation is to protect the occupied
people from violations of sovereignty by foreign powers, scholars
should examine Iraqi records to more fully appreciate the degree to
which the United States complied with the law of occupation in its
occupation of Iraq. This Part attempts to incorporate Iraqi records into
the scholarly record using the minutes kept and resolutions adopted by
the IGC.
A. The Establishmentof the IGC and its Relationship with the CPA
The IGC was established by L. Paul Bremer, the American diplomat
appointed by President Bush as the Administrator of the CPA.6 9 Bremer
and the CPA replaced the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA), the governing body initially established by
President Bush immediately following the U.S. invasion of Iraq and
headed by Jay Garner, a retired U.S. Army General.o ORHA oversaw
the post-invasion administration of Iraq from the invasion in March
until May 11, 2003, when Bremer and the CPA took control over the
day-to-day administration of the occupation of Iraq.
Several factors contributed to the establishment of the IGC as a
quasi-representative of post-Saddam Iraq, the first of which was
Bremer's refusal to allow the so-called Group of Seven, or G-7, to
function by itself as the de facto interim government.72 The G-7 was a
group of seven Iraqi representatives7 who, to one degree or another,
had opposed Saddam Hussein during his brutal rein over Iraq. Bremer
met with the G-7 shortly after arriving in Baghdad. The G-7 sought for
a rapid transition of authority from the CPA to the Iraqis,7 s and had
interpreted General Garner's statements of the previous weeks as
indicating that the CPA would establish a transitional government
within a few weeks following the CPA's assumption of control. 76
Bremer flatly denied these assertions, arguing that the process of
69.

CIUBLI MALLAT, IRAQ: GUIDE To LAW AND POLICY 28 (2009); Steven R. Weisman,

U.S. Set to Name Civilian to Oversee Iraq,N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/05/02/international/worldspecial/02POST.htmi.

70.

MALLAT, supra note 69, at 228-29.

7 1. Id.
72. L. PAUL BREMER III WITH MALCOLM MCCONNELL, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE
To BUILD A FUTURE OF HOPE, 78-79 (2006).

73. Id. at 46. The group included four Shi'i Muslims (Ahmad Chalabi, Ayad Allawi,
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and Abdul Aziz Hakim) and three Sunni Muslims (Naseer Chaderchi and the
two Sunni Kurds, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani). Id.
74. Id. at 45.
75. See, e.g., id. at 48-49.
76. Id. at 49. See also MALLAT, supra note 69, at 228.
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transferring authority to the Iraqis would be "incremental."n Bremer's
chief concern was that the G-7, in spite of all of its assistance, was
simply not representative enough of the Iraqi people.7 8 "There is only
one Sunni leader among you," stated Bremer. "There are no Turkmen
here, no Christians, no women."
A second factor behind the establishment of the IGC was Bremer's
refusal to allow Iraqis to hold elections to vote for an interim
government.80 "[W]e're not going to rush into elections because Iraq
simply has none of the mechanisms needed for elections - no census,
no electoral laws, no political parties, and all the related structure we
take for granted," said Bremer shortly after arriving in Baghdad.
Bremer stated that there was "no blanket prohibition" on self-rule, only
that "[he] want[ed] to do it [in] a way that takes care of [the CPA's]
concerns . . . Elections that are held too early can be destructive. It's got

to be done very carefully." 82
Under the direction of Bremer, a joint U.S.-U.K. Governance Team,
comprised of about 50 individuals, worked "[20] hours a day for more
than two months to come up with the initial [25] Iraqis for the [IGC]."a
The CPA worked tirelessly to ensure that key individuals were included
on the IGC,84 and that the body itself was representative-from an
ethnic, religious, and gender point of view-of all Iraqis.8 5 On Sunday
July 13, 2003, Bahr al-Uloum, one of Shi'a Islam's most respected
Imams and a member of the IGC, introduced the newly created IGC to
all Iraqis.8 6
CPA Regulation 6 outlined the anticipated authority of the IGC. It
states: "The CPA recognized the formation of the Governing Council as
the principal body of the Iraqi interim administration, pending the
establishment of an internationally recognized, representative
government by the people of Iraq, consistent with Resolution 1483.",81 It
77.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 49.

7 8. Id.
79. Id.
80.

Iraqi Governing Council, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/world/iraq/igc.htm (last modified Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Iraqi Governing Council];
see also BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 89.
81. BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supranote 72, at 19.

82.

Iraqi GoverningCouncil, supra note 80.

83.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 171. Some members of the IGC were

killed prior to the transfer of authority. E.g., id. at 359.
84. Id at 96-98 (the CPA employed various efforts to have influential Shi'ites, Abdul
Aziz Hakim and Sayyid Mohammad Bahr al-Uloum, agree to sit on the IGC).
85. Id. at 93.
86. Id. at 100-03 (outlining Bremer's account of the event).
87. Governing Council of Iraq, Coalition ProvisionalAuthority Regulation Number 6
(July 13, 2003), http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030713_CPAREG_6_Governing
Council-of Iraq_.pdf [hereinafter Regulation 61. It is not clear, however, whether there were
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is clear in both Bremer's record and in the minutes of the IGC that one
of the principle responsibilities "given" to the IGC by the CPA was to
oversee the preparations needed to write a constitution." Once it
became clear that the IGC would be succeeded by an interim Iraqi
government, to whom the CPA would transfer sovereignty, the IGC
assumed the responsibility of assisting the CPA in drafting the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which would govern the
country until a constitution could be written by an elected body.89 In his
introductory remarks at the press conference in which the IGC
introduced itself to the public, Bahr al-Uloum stated that the IGC's
objectives were to provide security for Iraqis, "eliminating the
consequences of political tyranny," de-Ba'athification, "uprooting ...
[Ba'ath] ideology from society," and beginning "the _rocess of writing
a constitution, leading to elections for a parliament." 9 Regulation 6 also
outlined the IGC's relationship to the CPA.
In accordance with Resolution 1483, the Governing Council and
the CPA shall consult and coordinate on all matters involving the
temporary governance of Iraq, including the authorities of the
Governing Council.
All officials of the CPA are hereby instructed promptly to
respond to all requests for experts, technical assistance or other
support requested by the Governing Council. 9 1
Theoretically, then, the CPA was supposed to consult with the IGC
"on all matters involving the temporary governance of IraV," including
security. In practice, however, this was rarely realized. The IGC
any official guidelines regarding the relationship between IGC resolutions and CPA orders and
regulations. In practice, the CPA had considerable oversight of the IGC activities, although the
IGC minutes demonstrate that the CPA, at times, attempted to circumvent IGC influence in
order to further its agenda. See infra Part III.B.
88.

See BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 97-98.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 101.
Regulation 6, supra note 87.
Fox, supra note 4, at 248 n.285.
Acknowledgment of consultations was mostly limited to the economic reforms
and usually consisted of the same general boilerplate rather than specific
delineations of a legislative path for a given reform. See e.g., Coalition
Provisional Authority Order 39 ... (order promulgated "[i]n close consultation
with and acting in coordination with the Governing Council"); Coalition
Provisional Authority Order 40 . . . (noting that the CPA had "worked closely
with the Governing Council to ensure that economic change occurs in a manner
acceptable to the people of Iraq"); see also Coalition Provisional Authority
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passed several resolutions that were, for the most part, substantive
contributions to the governance of Iraq during the first year of the
occupation. 93 Yet Bremer essentially held veto power, and used it. 94 In
effect, the IGC wielded only marginal authority.
The IGC had a rotating presidency in which one member of the IGC
would serve for one Gregorian month.9 5 Originally, the IGC also had an
executive council that was supposed to be composed of five individuals.
However, bickering over equal representation among different ethnic
and religious factions on the IGC necessitated a nine-member executive
council that, in the end, was unworkable.9 6 The IGC conducted its
regular meetings on Monday through Thursday, usually at 10 a.m. 7
Bremer or a CPA representative usually attended one of these meetings
each week. 98 The IGC also conducted irregular meetings as needed.
The most influential members of the IGC were Ibrahim al-Jaafari,
Abdul Aziz Hakim, Jalal Talabani, and Ahmad Chalabi.' 00
B. The Minutes of the IGC and the ConservationistPrinciple
The minutes kept and resolutions adopted by the IGC provide
Order 56 ...

; Coalition Provisional Authority Order 64 . .. (same language in

preamble to amendments to Company Law); Coalition Provisional Authority
Order 18 . . . (same language in preamble to Interim Law on Securities
Market); Coalition Provisional Authority Order 75 ... (same language as in
preamble to Realignment of Military Industrial Companies); Coalition
Provisional Authority Order 76 . . . (same language as in preamble to

Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises); Coalition Provisional Authority
Order 78 . . . (virtually same language as in preamble to reform of bankruptcy
procedures); Coalition Provisional Authority Order 80 . .. (same language as in
preamble to amendments to Trademarks and Descriptions Law).
Id
93.

See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.

94.

See BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 292-93. The most oft cited example

of Bremer vetoing an IGC decision occurred when Bremer vetoed an IGC resolution to make
Shari'ah Law the basis for personal status legal matters. Id. This decision was likely in keeping
with the law of occupation, as it was necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Fourth
Geneva Conventions were complied with, and likely necessary to preserve public order.
95. Id. at 123-24, 148; IraqiGoverning Council,supra note 80.
96.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 124.

97.
98.
99.

Id. at 123.
Id. at 194.
The IGC minutes, for example, often referred to special sessions held by the IGC to

discuss pressing matters. E.g., MAJLIS AL-HUKM, AL-IRAQ FI-ZILL AL-IHTILAL: MAHADIR
MAJIS AL-HUKM AL-INTIQALI 19/11/2003-25/2/2004 [THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL, IRAQI IN
THE SHADOW OF OCCUPATION: MINUTES OF THE INTERIM GOVERNING COUNCIL 11/19/2003 to

2/25/2004] (Ahmed al-Haj Hashim al-Difa'I ed.) [hereinafter 2004 IGC Minutes].
100. For a list of all members of the IGC, see Iraqi GoverningCouncil, supra note 80.
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scholars with unique insights into the transformational agenda adopted
by the CPA. Specifically, these minutes and resolutions enable scholars
to make more nuanced assessments of the CPA's respect for and
adherence to the international law of occupation during its occupation
of Iraq.
The IGC minutes reveal, for example, that in February 2004,
Ambassador Bremer requested that the IGC meet outside of its regularly
scheduled meetings to discuss the upcoming G8 summit, which the Iraq
0 During the meeting, the IGC
Central Bank was scheduled to attend.o'
chairman noted that "Ambassador Bremer [had] encouraged [the IGC to
issue] the banking law, which would prove that Iraqi financial
institutions were now working in accordance with specific laws."' 0 2 Yet
the banking law that the IGC had been presented with by the CPA
mirrored provisions in the laws governing the American Federal
Reserve Bank-laws that "emphasized the independence of the Bank
and the transparency of its work."' 0 3 This proposed law had not been
given to the financial committee established by the IGC, and the
financial committee had objections to the details of the law. 04 It was
further noted in the IGC minutes that the law, when translated from the
English back into the Arabic, reflected in some instances "the opposite
meaning of the original words." 05 Despite the IGC's reservations about
the substance of the law, its translation, and the CPA's lack of
consultation with the IGC in drafting the law, the minutes demonstrate
that Bremer wanted to sign the law into effect on February 7 2004, and
that he wanted the IGC to approve the law before this date.10d
On another occasion, the IGC minutes speak of the CPA's
involvement in forming the election committee, which was, according
to CPA Order 92, to be charged with "organiz[ing], oversee[in A
conduct[ing], and implement[ing] all elections set forth in the TAL."
This commission was "structured to ensure complete independence
from political influence and to benefit from close consultation with
international entities, such as the United Nations, that have impartially
and effectively administered genuine and credible elections in nations
emerging from periods of tyranny, conflict, and violent strife." 08 Given
the important role that the election commission would play in Iraq's
101. 2004 IGC Minutes, supra note 99, T 46.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, Coalition ProvisionalAuthority
Order 92 (May 31, 2004), http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040531 CPAORD 92
IndependentElectoral commissionof Iraq.pdf.
108. Id.
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transition into a self-governing, sovereign state, the IGC had obvious
concerns over its makeup.
The principal sentiment expressed by IGC members was that the
election commission needed to remain independent of all political,
religious, or ethnic influences. 0 9 The minutes record: "The situation is
tense now in the streets and either we [will] have an independent
committee or we wait until there is a sovereign state to do this.""l0 The
chief concern among IGC members was that Iraqis would perceive the
commission as being illegitimate."' The minutes of the IGC record the
following:
Hav[ing] Bremer form[] the [election] committee will make the
process subject to a lot of criticism . . . even if the committee is

neutral. The governing council can form this committee or it can
be formed by the government[,] but [it cannot be formed] by
Bremer. This is not suitable. The [IGC] does not want this
committee to be formed by the CPA[;] they want it to be initiated
and formed by [the IGC]. Their objection to hav[ing] it be[]
formed by the CPA is due to the following[.] [F]irst . . . any

elections or results of elections done by a committee formed by
the CPA are going to be illegitimate from the public and the
international point of view. It will not be a real representation of
the Iraqi people. Second, when the CPA forms this commission,
it will not be neutral. There will be a pre-engineering of the
results which implies that the results will be preplanned and
biased from the beginning.112
Ironically, it was an instance of the CPA's abrogation of the law of
occupation that, in the end, turned out to be one of its biggest Achilles'
heels. The United States chose to engage in a policy of deBa'athification to rid Iraq's leadership of any traces of Ba'athist
influences." 3 To be sure, the IGC was, for the most part, on board with
this policy.11 4 Yet the IGC did make its case for allowing low-level
Ba'athists to retain their employment in the new Iraq. In one particular
meeting in 2004, the IGC discussed the fate of the employees who lost
109. MAJLIS AL-HUKM, AL-IRAQ FI-ZILL AL-IHTILAL: MAHADIR MAJLIs AL-HUKM ALINTIQALI 2003 [THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL, IRAQ INTHE SHADOW OF OCCUPATION: MINUTES
OF THE INTERIM GOVERNING COUNCIL 2003]

135 (Ahmed al-Jah Jashim al-Difa'I ed., 2003)

[hereinafter 2003 IGC Minutes].

110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.

113.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supranote 72, at 39-42.

114. See Majlis al-Hukm, Qarrarat 'Aam 2003 [IGC General Resolutions, 2003],
Resolutions 21, 58 [hereinafter 2003 IGC Resolutions] (in the possession of the author).
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their employment as a result of the CPA's dissolving of several Iraqi
institutions and agencies." 5 The minutes from this meeting reveal that
the IGC mentioned thirty-five individuals who had lost their jobs as a
result of the de-Ba'athification order given by the IGC on May 16th of
2003.' 16 Among those who lost their job as a result of this resolution
were "senior staff and professors, engineers and doctors."" 7 The
minutes go on to state:
Some of these staff members who were fired are in the prime of
their age and have a lot of potential for this country in [the event
they are permitted] to return back to the public service. They can
contribute to the rebuilding of this country instead of having them
leav[e] the country and contribute to the building of another
country. Iraq needs people like these[,] and also these former
employees are living under very bad conditions due to their loss
of income. 1 8
Not only do these minutes from the IGC meetings reveal the CPA's
seeming disregard for the parameters established by the law of
occupation, but they also indicate the effectual hollowness of the CPA's
own regulations. Regulation 6, for example, provided that "the
Governing Council has certain authorities and responsibilities as
representatives of the Iraqi people, including ensuring that the Iraqi
people's interests are represented in both the interim administration and
in determining the means of establishing an internationally recognized,
representative government."I19
The minutes of the IGC also reveal that the CPA involved itself in
such matters as paying teachers' salaries,' 20 governing the use and
production of passports, 21 and influencing the appointments of security
and police force authorities 122-issues arguably outside the parameters
of an occupier's authority under traditional occupation law. In addition,
the minutes reveal that Bremer pressured the IGC to sign the
administrative law prematurely.123
Overall, the IGC minutes and resolutions reveal a systematic effort
by the CPA to transform Iraq in a manner that was, at times,
inconsistent with its obligations as an occupying power under the law of
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

2004 IGC Minutes, supra note 99,142.
Id.
Id.
Id
Regulation 6, supra note 87.
2003 IGC Minutes, supra note 109, 1 83.
Id.186.
Id. 167.
Id. 108.
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occupation. While many of the CPA's reforms were no doubt motivated
by good intentions and resulted in positive changes, several of these
reforms nonetheless contravened the historical parameters of the law of
occupation insofar as they altered Iraq's legal and political institutions.
To be sure, many such reforms were not absolutely necessary to secure
public order or to ensure adherence to other international legal
obligations, and therefore do not fall within the exceptions outlined in
the Article 43 of The Hague Convention and Article 64 of the Geneva
Convention. Furthermore, attempts by the CPA to grant a measure of
sovereignty to the Iraqis, primarily through the establishment of the
IGC, were, at best, ineffectual. The IGC was a creation of the CPA, and
the Iraqi people had little input into its composition or organization.
Even if the IGC was a legitimate representative body, the IGC minutes
and resolutions reveal that the desires of the IGC were at times stifled
by the CPA and demonstrate that the IGC was often unable to perform
the functions reserved for the de jure sovereign representative as
mandated by the law of occupation.

IV. IGC MINUTES

AND RESOLUTIONS:
THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY

A REBUFF TO ALTERNATIVE

Some scholars have argued that despite the apparent violations of the
law of occupation by the United States in its occupation of Iraq, the
transformative agenda pursued by the United States was nonetheless
legitimate.124 These arguments take various forms.' 25 This Part outlines
the central tenets of these alternative theories of legitimacy, and
measures the integrity of these claims against the insights provided by
the IGC minutes and resolutions.
A. The Work of the IGC Legitimized the CPA's
TransformationalAgenda
The most basic argument for the proposition that America's
transformative occupation in Iraq complied with international law is that
by creating and workin with the IGC, the CPA legitimized its
transformational agenda.' In other words, because the IGC represented
the Iraqi people, and because the CPA worked with the IGC in pursuit
of its transformative agenda, the CPA's actions are therefore legitimate.
The IGC minutes and resolutions do indeed point to some significant
124.
125.
126.

See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B, & W.C.
Id.
This seems to be the general thinking of Bremer and the CPA in their administration

of the occupation. See, e.g., BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 123.
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contributions made by the IGC during the first year of the U.S.
occupation of Iraq. The IGC minutes speak of successful joint
committees between the IGC and the CPAl27 and effective collaboration
between the IGC and the CPA on important issues,' 28 including the
Transitional Administrative Law. 2 The IGC also passed several
resolutions that either substantively contributed to portions of the CPA's
agenda or otherwise reflect broad powers exercised by the IGC.13 0 Yet
any temporary manifestations of sovereignty by the IGC were
outweighed by the CPA's systematic usurpation of authority and the
inability of the IGC to actually dictate the trajectory of the Iraqi polity
in post-Saddam Iraq. Indeed, the work of the IGC cannot be invoked to
legitimize the CPA's transformative agenda for several reasons.
To begin with, many reforms were initiated long before the IGC was
even established.
Moreover, the IGC was arguably not even a
legitimate representative body and therefore was incapable of exercising
its sovereign powers during the occupation. Despite assertions to the
contrary (even by IGC members themselves),132 the IGC was a creation
of the CPA, 3 1 with little input from Iraqi people. The CPA tried to
portray a semblance of legitimacy throughout the whole process by, in
the words of Bremer, "choreograph[ing]" a process by which the IGC
would "constitute" or "self-anoin[t]" itself,134 then "summon the
U[nited] N[ations], U[nited] S[tates], and U[nited] K[ingdom] for a
127. 2003 IGC Minutes, supra note 109, 19.
128. 2004 IGC Minutes, supra note 99, 1 149.
129. See BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 269,288, 292-93.
130. The following IGC resolutions are worth noting: 2003 Resolutions 4, 21, and 58
(orders pertaining to the de-Ba'athification process); Resolutions 5 and 6 (giving the IGC
oversight of its organization and operations); 2003 Resolutions 10, 11, and 13 (establishing
ministries and choosing ministers); 2003 Resolutions 13, 14, 29, 30, 33, 35-36, 42-45, 73, 85
(significant changes in the administrative structure of the state); 2003 Resolution 19 (setting
aside a day for commemorating the death of Fatima); 2003 Resolution 22 (changes to Iraqi
citizenship law); 2003 Resolutions 40 and 74 (decisions regarding Iraq's dealings with
international organizations); 2003 Resolutions 48 and 137 (personal status matters); 2004
Resolution 33 (approval of the TAL); 2004 Resolution 38 (revocation of law from previous
regime); 2004 Resolution 41 (regulation of property questions); 2004 Resolution 51
(establishment of Iraqi intelligence services); 2004 Resolutions 53, 54, and 55 (further changes
to administrative structure of state); 2004 Resolution 72 (approval of new flag design); and 2004
Resolutions 87 and 90 (changes in election system). 2003 IGC Resolutions, supra note 114;
Majlis al-Hukm, Qarrarat'Aam 2004 [IGC General Resolutions, 2004] [hereinafter 2004 IGC
Resolutions] (in the possession of the author).
131. BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 85 (describing reforms relating to cell
phones, currency, oil, and the economy).
132. Id. at 101 (during an IGC introductory press conference, Bahr al-Uloum stated that
the IGC "had been 'established through an Iraqi national initiative' . .
133. Id. at 171.
134. Id. at 100 ("This became known to [the CPA] irreverently as the 'immaculate
conception' option.").
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private meeting at which they would inform us that they had formed the
[IGC]."'" Then, together, they "would all repair to a large hall where
[the IGC] would present themselves to the world's press.""' Yet
Bremer's actions did not go unnoticed. During the press conference in
which the IGC introduced itself to all Iraqis, the first question posed
was by a BBC reporter, who asked the IGC: "'Isn't it true that' the
Council was just a creature of the Americans, had no powers, and was
essentially useless?"' 3 7
The Iraqi public knew that the IGC was a creation of the CPA and
that it did not possess the capacity that a sovereign, representative entity
ought to have possessed. The IGC minutes record that the Iraqi public
had voiced "hard criticism against the council,"' 38 and that the IGC
members themselves were concerned with their ability to gain the
support of the Iraqi people.' 3 9 Throughout the first year of the
occupation, the Iraqis were skeptical of the IGC's legitimacy and the
CPA's heavy hand in running the affairs of the country. The minutes
indicate that the IGC was concerned that the public would consider the
TAL to be merely a product of the Americans, despite the IGC's
input.140 However, Bremer was adamant that the "transfer" of
sovereignty to the Iraqis be "incremental," 41 and therefore he resisted
efforts by Iraqis-including the IGC-to turn over a measure of
sovereignty to a representative body.
An additional reason as to why the work of the IGC cannot be
invoked to legitimize the CPA's transformative agenda is because even
if the IGC was a legitimate representative body, its activities were
largely controlled by the CPA. The CPA did consult the IGC on
important matters, including, for example, the TAL 42 and how to deal
with the increasing threat that was Muqtada al-Sadr.143 Yet, the IGC
minutes and resolutions reveal a process in which the IGC was relegated
to advisor to the CPA or to executor of the CPA's demands.'" When
the IGC did not perform according to the CPA's desire, the CPA simply
stepped in and took over.14 5
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id
Id. at 102.
2004 IGC Minutes, supra note 99, T 42.
Id.
Id. 117.

141.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 49.

142. See id. at 269, 288, 292-93.
143. Id. at 135.
144. 2003 IGC Minutes, supra note 109, 1 61 (noting that Bremer threatened to simply
appoint deputies to positions of minister on his own if the IGC couldn't agree on a process to do
so).
145. Id
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Rarely did the IGC act with true autonomy or sovereignty. Dozens of
IGC resolutions, for example, include "notices" at the end of the
resolution that reveal the thinking of the IGC regarding its relationship
with the CPA.146 Perhaps the most common notice is the one that simply
states: "There is no need for CPA intervention [regarding this
resolution]." 4 7 Similar notices reveal even more deference to the CPA:
"This resolution is in need of CPA approval." 4 8 Some notices simply
reveal the oversight that the CPA had in the drafting of the resolution:
"The CPA recommends [submitting] this resolution to [a particular]
committee [for further review or implementation]." 49 Others merely
state: "The CPA has agreed to this resolution."' 50
The minutes reveal that the CPA was heavily involved in the
activities of the IGC by overseeing the IGC's decisions and dictating the
parameters of its powers.' 5 ' Even in the process of creating the IGC, the
CPA, according to the IGC minutes, acted in such a way so as to cause
the IGC members to feel as if they were not present.152 The IGC
minutes reveal, for example, that the real discussions pertaining to the
composition of the Governing Council took place between Bremer and
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, not between the CPA and the IGC.153
Once established, the IGC made sure to refrain from making any
significant decisions without obtaining approval from Bremer.' Yet
even decisions clearly within the jurisdiction of the IGC were struck
down by Bremer. For example, the minutes speak of the LGC's decision
to establish the National Commission of Media to supervise the
media in Iraq. This commission will issue licenses and will be
independent from the Government. Also, the council wants to
give authority to the Ministry of Communication to issue licenses
related to waves of broadcasting and the ministry wants to have
control the policies, cultural, and media issues in addition to
licenses to be given by the commission that they want to form.'5
However, the CPA refused to sign off on the IGC's decision,
"because [the CPA] wanted this authority to be for an independent
E.g., 2003 IGC Resolutions, supra note 114, Resolutions 19, 22, 25, 32, 85.
Id.
E.g., id. Resolutions 29, 30, 45, and 49.
Id. Resolution 50.
Id. Resolutions 52, 54.
E.g., 2003 GC Minutes, supra note 109,1 135.
I52. Id. 127.
153. Id.178.
154. See id $ 135 (noting that the IGC agreed to discuss election committee issues with
Bremer to make sure there was "no misunderstanding between [the IGC and the CPA]").
155. Id. $ 27.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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agency."' 5 6 This reflects the broader trend of the CPA's treatment of the
IGC, which is that the CPA exercised a de facto veto over Council
actions,1 57 relegating the IGC to a mere advisory body.
From the beginning, Bremer sought to prop up the IGC in the eyes of
the public, often through creative initiatives. This was no doubt a
strategic decision, as Bremer knew that the CPA's success hinged
largely on its ability to further its reforms while simultaneously
managing to convince the Iraqi public that the IGC was behind these
reforms. For example, even before the IGC was created, Bremer had
"asked [his] staff to come up with a long list of 'early wins' for the
[c]ouncil."' 8 According to Bremer, these "early wins" "were decisions
[the IGC] could announce quickly to show the Iraqi people that the
[IGC] was indeed assuming responsibility."' 59 Another example took
place following the horrific bombing on August 19, 2003 on the U.N.
Compound in Baghdad, in which the then-coordinator of the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was killed. 6 0 After
speaking with the IGC about the event, Bremer suggested six steps that
the IGC should take immediately to promote a calm and resolute
response to the bombing.' 6 ' According to Bremer, the IGC was
"shocked into silence," by Bremer's words.162 "Gradually it dawned on
them that the moment to act had arrived," said Bremer.163
The IGC minutes reveal that the CPA also used the IGC to promote
its transformative agenda. For example, the CPA pressured the IGC to
156. Id
157. See Fox, supra note 4, at 207 (citing Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Iraq Occupation Faces
New Challenge; Shiite Demand to Elect Constitution'sDrafters CouldDelay Transfer of Power,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2003, at A20 (observing that in crafting a process to draft a new Iraqi
constitution, "[t]he occupation authority is allowing the Governing Council to choose how the
drafters will be selected, but Bremer reserves the right to veto the decision"); Richard A. Oppel,
Jr. & Robert F. Worth, After the War: Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at A7; Vivienne
Walt, Iraq Schools Trying to Close Book on Ba'athistRegime, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2003, at
A15 ("The U.S. administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, who has veto power over the
Governing Council, has not approved the council's decision to fire teachers who were Ba'ath
Party members."); Edward Wong, The Strugglefor Iraq: The Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2004, at Al1).
158.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 123.

159. Id. For example, Bremer "suggested that [the IGC] publicly 'demand' the Coalition to
restore electricity generation to prewar levels by October I and also find urgent ways to deal
with unemployment." Id. Since the CPA already had these plans in place, "this would be a winwin operation," said Bremer, "in which the [IGC] would get the public credit when it made the
demand of the CPA and when we responded." Id
160. Top UN Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello Killed in Terrorist Blast in Baghdad, UN
NEWS CENTRE (Aug. 19, 2003), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=8023#.UJKgrTh98s.
161.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 142.

162.
163.

Id.
Id.
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sign the Iraq Central Bank law, despite reservations from some of the
IGC members.1 64 The minutes state that one member of the IGC
suggested that the council just "pass the law . . . and then go back later
to review and modify it." 65 Another member of the IGC retorted:
"[But] all the laws that Ambassador Bremer asked the council to pass
for signature are presented in this way!" 6 6
The CPA also made important decisions without consulting with the
IGC. For example, the minutes speak of an incident that occurred when
portions of the communication network in Iraq were failing. 6 6 The IGC
expected to oversee the problem in cooperation with the CPA. 168
According to the LGC minutes, there was a company that was charged to
oversee the communication network, 6 9 and a CPA Employee-an
American-was tasked with supervising this company.' "[T]he [IGC]
heard via the media that the contract [to oversee the communication
network] was awarded to another company."' 7 The minutes state that
"[t]his issue was discussed with Ambassador Bremer and the council
expressed its concern that this is not a cooperation between partners and
that the council feel that they are not within the decision-making

circle."l 72
The minutes also speak of an incident regarding the issue of
federalism in relation to the TAL. The IGC was meeting "on a daily
basis" to discuss important issues relating to the TAL, and were
involved in "tense discussions" with the CPA regarding the issue of
federalism.' 7 3 In the midst of these discussions, the IGC was notified
that the CPA would be holding a press conference on important issues
relating to the TAL.174 Worried that they were not notified of this press
conference the IGC sent a delegate to the CPA to discuss their concerns
with them. 75 Several IGC members expressed their frustrations over the
CPA's actions, with one member complaining that "this [was] the
general policy of the CPA"--namely, "that they go with their decision
regardless of the council's orientations."' 7 6 This member felt that it was
the role of the lGC to make these important decisions regarding the
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
[73.
174.
175.
176.

2003 IGC Minutes, supra note 109, 148.
Id.
Id.
Id.127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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future of Iraq.17 7 Overall, the IGC felt undermined in their efforts to
exercise any measure of authority over the reconstruction of Iraq.' 7 8
The IGC minutes, as well as Bremer's record, reveal that there was
also serious interpersonal discord between the IGC and the CPA. The
IGC was known to go to the press, including the New York Times, to
express their frustrations.179 As for the CPA, Bremer stated early on that
he felt the IGC was lazy, 8 0 ineffective, 8 1 unfocused, 82 and
disorganized.'8 3 He said that working with the IGC was "like playing
tee-ball with players who couldn't hit the ball teed up for them,"' 84 and
that the IGC "couldn't organize a parade, let alone run the country."' 85
As early as October 2003, Bremer wondered if the IGC even "[had] a
future."
Yet, putting aside for a moment whether the IGC was actually
competent, it should be noted that legal scholars are highly skeptical of
the notion that the occupying power can appropriate authority from the
de jure sovereign merely by creating a local governing body.8 7 This
skepticism is based primarily upon Articles 7 and 47 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. Article 7 provides that individuals in occupied
territories "may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the
rights secured to them by the present Convention." 8 8 Article 47
expands on this injunction:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be
deprived, in any case or manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the
present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the
occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of
the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the
authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying

177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 181-82.
180. Id. at 123, 189. Bremer said the IGC "works fewer hours in a week than the CPA
works every day." Id. at 123. He also stated that "nothing ever emerged from the council," and
they were the "Committee of the Black Hole." Id. at 195.
181. See id. at 168.
182. Id. at 195.
183. Id. at 123.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 171.
186. Id. at 188-89.
187. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 4, at 248.
188. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 7, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva
Convention].
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Thus, as Fox states, occupying powers "cannot accomplish indirectly
through agreements or pliant local administrators what they are
prohibited from accomplishing directly: changing existing laws or
institutions so as to diminish the rights of the protected persons." 90 In
other words, even if the IGC was a legitimate representative body of the
Iraqi people,191 they could not have relinquished their sovereign rights
via agreement nor consultation with the CPA.
B. IGC Consent
Assuming for a moment that the IGC could in fact relinquish its
sovereign rights under the Geneva Convention and the law of
occupation, they still would have had to actively consent to do so by,
inter alia, approving the CPA reforms. IGC consent, the argument goes,
"operates to waive any claims of infringement on the rights of the postoccupation de jure regime, whose interests the CPA, as de facto
temporary authority, was bound to protect."' 92 In other words, "[e]ven if
the CPA exceeded its authority under occupation law . . . the right-

holder potentially injured by such acts renounced any claim of injury or
illegality."' But the IGC did not fully consent to the panoply of
reforms instituted by the CPA.
To be sure, the IGC occasionally made statements in support of
certain CPA reforms. Adnan Pachachi, speaking to the Security Council
as an IGC representative on July 22, 2003, stated, for example, that
there were several "pressing issues to be addressed by the interim
Governing Council," including the need to "re-examin[e] the legislation
enacted by the previous regime . .. rebuild its economy, modernize its

industrial sector, reform its educational system, improve its sanitation
services and provide basic necessities to all its citizens."' 94 Yet these
can hardly be seen as statements of support for the CPA Agenda; rather,
they demonstrate the obvious exigencies facing post-Saddam Iraq.
Regardless, the IGC minutes clearly indicate that the IGC had
significant reservations over many of the CPA's reforms and the
manner in which the CPA went about enacting those reforms.
189. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 45, art. 47.
190. Fox, supra note 4, at 250.
191. See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 21, $ 4 (noting that the IGC embodied "the
sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period").
192. Fox, supra note 4, at 247.
193. Id.
194. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4791st mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4791 (July 22, 2003)
quoted in Fox, supra note 4, at 248-49.
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For example, the IGC did not approve of the reforms enacted by the
CPA relating to the elections of the provincial councils.195 These
councils were relatively influential insofar as they were charged with
electing the provincial governors. ' CPA Order 71 ("Local
Governmental Powers") stipulated that "members of each [Provincial]
Council shall be selected in accordance with criteria agreed upon by the
Governing Council and the CPA."' 7 The IGC minutes, however, reveal
a process that was completely dominated by the CPA. Granted, the IGC
failed at times to adequately fulfill part of its responsibilities relating to
the process of selecting candidates who would supervise the provincial
council elections.1 9 8 Nevertheless, the minutes point out that "[t]he CPA
as usual disregard[ed] this issue and went for the practical change in its
own way." 9 9 The IGC pressured the CPA to repeat the elections. 20 0
Yet, "[w]hen the CPA was told about this repeating the elections, the
CPA blamed the council and told the council that they did not do their
job."2 0 ' In addition, the minutes state that it was a matter of "Iraqi
dignity" for the IGC to stand up to the CPA and have more oversight in
the selection of representatives who supervise the provincial council
elections.202 One IGC member stated, "the CPA assigned a person to be
the chair of the council in Gazaliyah in Baghdad when that person is not
even from that area; in addition he is a thief."203
Moreover, the IGC did not agree with the CPA's refusal to hold
elections.204 Nor did they consent to the makeup of the election
committee205 or to the strong role of the CPA in the drafting of the
TAL.2 06 Taken together, these examples from the IGC minutes
undermine assertions that the IGC consented to the CPA's reforms.
C. The ConservationistPrincipleis an Anachronism
Scholars have argued that the imperatives of contemporary
occupations render the conservationist principle anachronistic in
195. 2003 IGC Minutes, supra note 109,178.
196. Id
197. Local Government Powers, Coalition ProvisionalAuthority Order Number 71 (Apr.
6, 2004), http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040406_CPAORD_71_Local-Governmen
talPowers_.pdf.
198. 2003 IGC Minutes, supra note 109, T 78.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. 78-79.
203. Id.
204. Id 135.
205. Id.
206. Id 117.
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contemporary international law. 20 7 Scholars have suggested that, in
practice the conservationist principle has "been demonstrated to be a
fiction'1o9 and is "irrelevant"209 or "inadequate." 210 State practice since
World War 1-particularly the sweeping reforms instituted in Japan
and Germany in the aftermath of World War II-lend credence to this
proposition. ' Other scholars argue that because very few states have
acknowledged being bound by the law of occupation, the law is
essentially obsolete, or at least outdated.2 12
In making these arguments, scholars and government authorities
point to the differences between the historical context in which the law
of occupation emerged and the circumstances in which the law of
occupation is applied today.2 13 When occupation law was codified in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wars were waged among
Western states primarily to secure geopolitical advantage, "not to affect
the quality of governance in other states." 2 14 "'Misrule' by a defeated
regime was only rarely of concern to a victorious occupying power,"
whereas "[m]isrule by occupiers . . . occurred with regularity." 2 5

Contemporary occupations, on the other hand, have been directed more
toward transformational state-building in an attempt to further the
principals of international human rights law.2 16
According to this theory, the raison d*dtat of the law of occupation
is to prevent abuses by the occupying power. Yet, contemporary
occupations are more often oriented toward changing the political,
207. E.g., CARL ScHMITT, THE NoMos OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
Jus PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 207-09 (G.L. Ulmen trans., 2003); Neehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of

Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 721 (2005); Cohen, supra note 23; Scheffer,
supra note 16.
208. Boon, supra note 53, at 61.
209. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 9
(2006).
210. Boon, supra note 53, at 63.
211. Id. at 62. However, as noted by Boon, only the Hague Convention applied to these
occupations, as "[t]he occupations of Germany and Japan took place before the Geneva
Conventions were codified," Id. at 62 n.22. Some scholars have argued that the Hague
provisions relating to occupation law did not apply to the occupations of Germany and Japan.
GREGORY Fox, HUMANTARIAN OCCUPATION 8-12 (2008).

212. See e.g., McGurk, supra note 17, at 459. McGurk was an attorney for the General
Counsel to the CPA and the Office of the Legal Advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
McGurk stated that the traditional law of occupation, with its status quo presumption, "reflects a
state-centered, nineteenth-century conception of European warfare and bears no relation to
modern military conflict or the contemporary thrust of public international law." Id. at 458.
McGurk's thesis necessitates the question as to why the United States agreed to be bound by the
law of occupation in the first place.
213. Id.
214. Fox, supra note 4, at 262.
215. Id.
216. McGurk, supra note 17, at 464.
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economic, and legal institutions of the occupied country, not annexation
or pillage.217 By invading and subsequently occupying Iraq, the United
States, for example, sought to "buil[d] transparent institutions,
establis[h] conditions for economic growth, remov[e] the vestiges of
tyranny, establis[h] a rule of law that protects human rights, and creat[e]
the framework for competitive multi-party elections."
According to
these theorists, then, the paradox, if not quixotry, is clear: the law of
occupation, which was historically designed to uphold the status quo in
order to prevent abuses by the occupying power, requires in modem
times upholding the discriminatory legal and political systems of ousted
tyrants, while simultaneously preventing reforms by the occupying
power that would actually prevent these abuses from persisting.2 1 9
Moreover, the law of occupation, these scholars argue, should be
interpreted in line with the developments in international human rights
law since World War II, especially considering that the international
law of occupation includes very few examples of state practice and has
remained virtually ossified since its codification in the early twentieth
century. 220 After all, they argue, the full implementation of the
transformational agenda adopted by the United States in Iraq would
have significantly enhanced human rights in Iraq. 221 As a matter of
precedent in this regard, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld many of
Israel's administrative changes in the occupied territories by
interpreting article 43 of the Hague Regulations as imposing only a
"duty to act as a proper government that looks after the local population
in all fields of life," 22 leading one scholar to describe this as the
"benevolent occupation" approach.2 23
The assertion that the conservationist principle is anachronistic on
the basis that it would be unjust, if not immoral, to strictly apply the
principal to contemporary occupations of failed states, is mostly
incorrect, for at least four reasons. First, this assertion rests on the
incorrect assumption that the ousted government-as opposed to the
people themselves-is the rightful holder of sovereignty. 24 Critics of
the conservationist principle assert that it protects the interests of the de
jure sovereign, and, the thinking goes, if the dejure sovereign has been
ousted by its people or by foreign invasion, then there is no de jure
217. Roberts, supra note 3, passim.
218. McGurk, supra note 17, at 458.
219. See Cohen, supra note 23, at 499.
220. Fox, supra note 4, at 246-47.
221. McGurk, supra note 17, at 454.
222. Ja'amait Ascan v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, (1982) 37(4) PD 785, 800,
quoted in DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE 68 (2002).
223. DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE 69 (2002).

224.

Cohen, supra note 23, at 522.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

31

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 2

Soo

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL IAW

[Vol. 24

sovereign, the interests of whom must be protected. And even if the
interests of the de jure sovereign were to be protected, the fact that the
de jure sovereign was a dictator or tyrant makes those interests
illegitimate and therefore unworthy of protection under the law.
These assertions miss a critical development in international law
during the last century, which is that international law "recognizes the
principle that sovereignty lies in a people, not in a political elite." 225
Thus, whether or not an ousted leader or government was tyrannical, the
occupying power, even in transformational occupations, is obligated to
respect rightful holders of sovereignty-that is, the people. Considering
the axiomatic nature of this proposition to U.S. constitutional history
and jurisprudence, it is surprising that the United States, in its
occupation of Iraq, was so quick to assume responsibilities legally
reserved for the sovereign people of Iraq. 226 "[R]egime collapse does
not extinguish the sovereignty" of the occupied state, 227 nor does "total
defeat and disintegration of the governing regime" lead to a transfer of
sovereignty to the occupying state. 228 Regardless, international law has
evolved such that it can penetrate state sovereignty in order to protect
individual rights, and the rights outlined in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, for example, were clearly directed toward securing the
rights of individuals, not regimes.
Second, the doctrine of "sovereign equality" cautions against
allowing one nation to dictate the social, legal, economic, and political
makeup of another state.229 The doctrine of sovereign equality stands for
the proposition that "every state has an equal standing in international
law" and that each state contributes to a plural international society. 230
Under sovereign equality, "all states have an equal entitlement to
participate in the formation of international law . . . [and] [a]ny state

claiming a right under international law has to accord all other states the
same right." ' By eliminating the conservationist principle, we open the
Pandora's box of allowing some states to dictate the internal affairs of
225.

BENVENIsn, supra note 10, at 95.

226. Granted, not all states adhere to the proposition that sovereignty lies with the people
rather than the regime. Yet even so, if such a regime was removed from power, the sovereignty
previously exercised by the regime would, ipso facto, transfer to the people. At issue here is the
representative of popular sovereignty; the principle of "international legal sovereignty" for the
state remains a separate issue. See Cohen, supra note 23, at 525-26.
227.

BENVENISn, supra note 10, at xi.

2 2 8. Id.
229. Declarationon Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operationAmong States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 123-24 (Oct. 24,
1970).
230. Cohen, supra note 23, at 527.
231. Id. at 527-28.
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another state, while prohibiting concomitant reciprocity.
The third reason why the conservationist principle is not
anachronistic is because although the law of occupation has not been
"practiced" per se by states (insofar as states have refused to be bound
by it in their occupational endeavors), occupation law has nonetheless
been widely recognized by States as a binding norm in international
law. States have, for example, published guidelines in their national
military manuals that provide insight into that state's perception of the
nature of acceptable conduct by their armed forces during occupation.2 3 2
Perhaps the most notable among these is the so-called Lieber Code, a
text23 written by Dr. Francis Lieber in 1863 during the American Civil
War. Moreover, to rescind the conservationist principle would "largely
eviscerate the important assumption of non-annexation at the heart of
occupation law," 74 while also "impermissibly blend[ing] jus in bello
andjus ad bellum principles." 235
Accordingly, the Iraq War stands as the preeminent case study of
how occupation law is and should be applied in contemporary
occupations, especially given the explicit U.S. acknowledgment that it
would be bound by the law of occupation in the lead up to the invasion.
Just because the circumstances surrounding the application of this law
differ from those in which the law developed over a century ago does
not lessen the relevance of the underlying principles. To argue
otherwise would be akin to arguing, mutatis mutandis,2 36 that an
important domestic law ought to be struck down simply because the
historical circumstances giving rise to its original legislation are
different from the contemporary circumstances in which it is applied.
The fourth reason why the conservationist principle is not
anachronistic is because it is essential to upholding fundamental
principles of international law, including the principle of selfdetermination. The critical assumption underlying the U.S. approach in
Iraq and the theory that the conservationist principle is anachronistic is
that the occupying power knows what is in the best interests of the
occupied people and that it will act accordingly. Besides hearkening
back to the colonialist shadows of yesteryear, this assumption is simply
incorrect, as demonstrated in the minutes of the IGC. The following
232. Fox, supra note 4, at 231-32.
233. The Lieber Code: Instructionsfor the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field by Order of the Secretary of War, arts. 31-47 (1863), reprintedin THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 158, 164-67 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).

234. Fox, supra note 4, at 296.
235. Id.
236. The most important difference, of course, being that a domestic law is binding on all
citizens, whereas international law is binding only to the extent that a sovereign state consents,
with the major exceptions being laws governing gross violations of human rights and other
peremptory norms (jus cogens), to which all states are bound.
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exchange between Bremer and Ibhrahim al-Jaafari, a member of the
IGC, is illustrative. Bremer stated to al-Jaafari, "We simply have to
improve the performance of the Council."2 3 7 Al-Jaafari replied, "With
respect, Ambassador ... [i]f the Council is weak you have no one to
blame but yourself, since you appointed it. And we cannot expect the
Council to act responsibly if it doesn't have authority." 238
Another example comes from the 2004 IGC minutes, which indicate
that the IGC encountered difficulties in working with other Iraqi
authorities because these other authorities were also working with the
CPA, and these other authorities sensed that the CPA was the real
powerbroker. 2 39 The minutes note that IGC member Sami al-Askari
attended a meeting of the Iraqi Council of Ministers. Mr. al-Askari
stated that the Council of Ministers was "uncomfortable dealing with
the [IGC]," 240 partly because the Council of Ministers was inclined to
believe that they were equal to the IGC in authority based largely on the
manner in which Bremer and the CPA had interacted with the Council

of Ministers. 2 4 1
One final example of how the conservationist principle supports the
doctrine of self-determination relates to the CPA's involvement in the
drafting of the TAL. The IGC minutes indicate that the IGC was
concerned over the public's perception that the CPA was essentially
writing the future constitution of Iraq in its involvement in drafting the
TAL. 2 One member of the IGC, Dr. Hashim al-Hasani, mentioned that
he was involved in the drafting of the TAL and that he knew that
Bremer was not personally involved in the process. 243 Nonetheless, Dr.
al-Hasani stated that "people are saying that Bremer and his advisors
wrote the law." 244 This incident demonstrates the inherent relevance of
the conservationist principle to contemporary occupations, insofar as it
illustrates how self-governance is hampered when sovereignty is
temporarily usurped-or merely appears, in the eyes of the occupied
population, to be usurped-by the occupying power.
That the United States sought to improve the economic, political,
and human rights situation in Iraq is undisputed, and there can be little
doubt that many of the reforms instituted by the United States in Iraq
yielded or will eventually yield positive results in Iraq. Yet, as the IGC
minutes demonstrate, good-intentioned and even positive reforms can
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

BREMER WITH MCCONNELL, supra note 72, at 201.
Id. at I17.
2004 IGC Minutes, supra note 99, at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at I17.
Id.
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still have long-lasting, negative effects on the occupied state, including
wide-spread mistrust of reforms that would otherwise have been
accepted by the occupied population had there not been a suspicion of
foreign involvement. Moreover, the temporary usurpation of
sovereignty, even to implement positive reforms, inevitably fosters an
aura of elitism among the "expert" occupiers. Such arrogance was
evident in the IGC minutes.24 5
The CPA was arguably more qualified than many Iraqi authorities on
several matters of governance. Yet many qualified Iraqis had been
repressed by Saddam for over thirty years, and had little opportunity to
hone their professional skills. Regardless, it may be argued that the
object of self-governance is not necessarily to get things perfect the first
time. Indeed, by stripping the Iraqis of the opportunities to be the
principal decision makers in the reconstruction of their country, the
CPA stifled growth and, more importantly, robbed Iraqis of
responsibility. No matter how "expert" the reforms instituted by the
CPA were, they were inherently more likely to fail than they would
have been had the Iraqis instituted them, simply because future
responsibility for these reforms cannot be ascribed to the Iraqis
themselves. This, in turn, thwarts long-term accountability.
Finally, to argue that the conservationist principle is anachronistic is
to render the entire Iraq experience incoherent. After all, the United
States explicitly agreed to be bound by the law of occupation. To argue
post hoc that the central component to the law of occupation was
anachronistic and thus inapplicable is tantamount to undermining one of
the axiomatic principles of international law-namely, state practice.
Indeed, the law of occupation was recognized as an international legal
doctrine of sufficient merit to impel the United States, 246 the United
Kingdom, 247 and the United NationS248 to acknowledge its existence in
the lead up to the war. Not only did the United States, at least initially
modify its practice to conform to the law of occupation, but it did so
explicitly out of a legal obligation, 249 satisfying the opinio juris
245. E.g., id. at 159-62 (U.S. authorities telling the Iraqi authorities how to set up their
defense intelligence systems, encouraging the Iraqis to establish an intelligence system "like the
one in Britain"); id. at 123 (Bremer said that working with the IGC was "like playing tee-ball
with players who couldn't hit the ball teed up for them"); id. at 171 (Bremer stated that the IGC
"couldn't organize a parade, let alone run the country").
246. Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United
States of America, Letter Dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8,
2003) [hereinafter Letter from the Permanent Representatives].
247. Id.
248. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 9.
249. Letter from the Permanent Representatives, supra note 246.
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requirement for state practice to arise to the level of customary
international law. That the law of occupation was considered by all
parties involved in the Iraq War-including, remarkably, the occupying
power itself-to constitute a binding legal obligation under international
law speaks conclusively to the status of the conservationist principle in
international law during the lead up to the Iraq War.
Regardless, scholars who argue that the conservationist principle is
anachronistic have failed to outline a nuanced analysis of the
implications concomitant to their argument. That is, if the law of
occupation is in fact dead, then what legal norms are in place to protect
the occupied population from abuses of authority by the occupying
power? If there are no legal norms in place, how should the
international community work to ensure that contemporary occupations
are conducted in accordance with international human rights law and
state sovereignty? If transformative occupations are to be allowed, what
checks are or should be put in place to restrain tendencies by more
powerful states to effect changes in smaller, less powerful states? By
failing to properly consider or address some of these basic issues, these
scholars obfuscate the fundamental issue in the occupation of Iraq,
which is whether the United States acted lawfully in its occupational
endeavors, and, in turn, how the international community can best foster
democratic change while upholding the sovereign rights of the occupied
state.
V. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE A JUS POST BELLUM FOR
TRANSFORMATIVE OCCUPATIONS

Even if the conservationist principle was maintained in its entirety,
critics of the conservationist principle are correct in stating that the
application of the conservationist principle to contemporary,
transformative occupations potentially creates as many problems as it
prevents. Indeed, even if the principle of the inalienability of
sovereignty by force was deemed to be relevant to contemporary
occupations in failed or post-conflict states, it would nonetheless be
unworkable or, at best, impractical. To wit, it would have been
impossible for post-Saddam Iraq-a state lacking a functioning
government and suffering from the effects of thirty years of
dictatorship, which included two wars-to have accomplished even a
fraction of the necessary reforms that were overseen and directed by the
CPA. Indeed, had the United States or the international community
withheld assistance to Iraq on the grounds that such assistance
contravened the law of occupation, it would have constituted a
strikingly immoral and formalistic decision.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss3/2
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Yet, in acknowledging that in some circumstances it may not be
feasible to preserve the status quo ante bellum as mandated by the law
of occupation, it is not necessary to alter this law altogether, as some
scholars have argued. 250 Rather, the question, posed by one scholar,
must be asked: "How can the 'transformative aspects of occupation'
required by human rights principles . .. be reconciled with the spirit of

the conservation principle and its core premise of the inalienability of
sovereignty by force?" 2'1
Drawing on the insights provided by the minutes kept and
resolutions adopted by the IGC, this Article outlines several principles
essential to ajus post bellum that more effectively balances the tension
between human rights-based, transformative occupations and popular
sovereignty. To be sure, these principles are not exhaustive; nor should
they be examined in isolation from other principles outlined in the
emerging literature on jus post bellum, some of which were examined
above. The ensuing analysis seeks merely to incorporate the lessons
learned from the IGC minutes and resolutions into the emerging
literature on jus post bellum.
This Article proposes that the jus post bellum law of transformative
occupation be anchored by three fundamental propositions: (1) where
possible, the military command of the occupying state should be
separate and distinct from a multinational civilian command; (2) this
multinational civilian command should be headed by an executive
council composed of citizen representatives from the occupied state,
who, as the de facto sovereign, may authorize transformative reforms;
and, (3) the multinational civilian command should refrain, where
possible, from enacting reforms until all major hostilities have ceased.
Regarding the first proposition, the IGC minutes and resolutions
clearly outline the dangers inherent in allowing the occupying state to
monopolize the decision-making process pertaining to reforms. In states
that require transformative occupations, the potential for wide-scale
violence-as realized in Iraq-is constant, primarily because there is
often a power vacuum, there are varied factions competing for power,
there is usually foreign interference, and the rule of law is often
subjugated to the exigencies of post-conflict survival.2 52 Yet, as
evidenced by the IGC minutes and resolutions, when the occupying
state has control over both military operations and civilian operations
(i.e., the process of democratic reforms), the potential for dangerous
confluence of the two lines of authority increases. In these instances,
decision makers overseeing legal, economic, and political reforms risk
250.
251.

See, e.g., McGurk, supra note 17; see also BENVENISTI, supra note 10, at xi.
Cohen, supra note 23, at 522.

252.

See generallyTHOMAS RICKS, FlASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ

149-297 (2006) (detailing the breakdown in security in post-Saddarn Iraq).
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basing their decisions primarily on military considerations as opposed to
non-lethal factors that would otherwise govern the decision-making
process.
The CPA often made decisions regarding the dissolution of key
agencies that were influenced by military concerns, even against the
strong pushback by IGC members 25 3 and other experts.25 4 It is not
unreasonable to think that in weighing competing interests, the CPA
would have occasionally elevated the interests of fellow American
soldiers over the Iraqi eople. Bremer was, at times, intimately engaged
in military decisions.
Undertaking significant reforms pertaining to
democratization, economic liberalization, and the advancement of
human rights is hard enough in peacetime; to allow these decisions to be
made by the same entity engaged in overseeing security in the country
would result in unpalatable situations where occupation officials make
decisions regarding the future of the occupied country based on factors
that may have limited relevance to the occupied population.
As for the second proposition, the IGC minutes and resolutions
speak of the need to give the occupied population a voice in any
transformational agenda. 5 This is perhaps the most important lesson
derived from the IGC minutes, and ought to occupy an axiomatic
position in a jus post bellum. It is, after all, the right of the occupied
people to determine what reforms to enact and how to enact them. Selfdetermination stands for the proposition that all people have a voice in
their own self-government. 25 The authority given to the IGC was token
authority, and this hampered the CPA's and Iraq's ability to effectively
stabilize and govern Iraq. The transfer of sovereignty by the CPA to the
Iraqi Interim Government was commendable, even if it was late in
coming. In the proposed jus post bellum, this type of transition has to

occur earlier in transformational occupations in order to uphold the
principles of self-determination and popular sovereignty.
How a particular "interim sovereign" will look will depend on the
circumstances of the occupation. At a minimum, however, the interim
sovereign should be headed by an executive council composed of
indigenous citizen representatives. These representatives should be
capable of leading their country during the transition period, and should
253. E.g., 2004 IGC Minutes, supra note 99,$ 42.
254. Disbanding the Iraqi army is popularly discussed only in the context of simply
"dumping 1.4 million men into a shattered economy" without an afterthought of the
consequence. RJCKS, supra note 252, at 72.
255. Dexter Filkins, Desert Sturm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/02/26/books/review/26filkins.html.
256. See supra Part III.B.
257. The terms "self-determination" and "people" have received extensive attention in the
literature. See generally Ved P. Nanda, 29 DENV. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (2001).
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be representative of the ethnic, religious, and political makeup of their
country. 258 This bd
body should be chosen by election. Its primary goal and
responsibility should be to oversee preparations to form a representative
government capable of standing on its own, and to authorize reforms
necessary to achieve that goal.
Because the executive council will be ill-equipped to function on its
own, likely due to a lack of resources, expertise, and enforcement
mechanisms, they will need assistance from foreign entities. Ideally this
entity will be a multilateral authority that enjoys broad international
support and, again, is distinct from the military power that is in charge
of the day-to-day security in the occupied state. The state responsible
for the invasion and occupation may have a place on the multinational
authority. Regardless, the executive committee would have final sayveto power, essentially-over all proposed reforms.
The third and final principle of the proposed jus post bellum is that,
where possible, reforms should be undertaken only when major
hostilities have ceased. The purpose of this proposition is two-fold: first,
it reduces the likelihood that security concerns will influence
transformational decision making; and, second, it will encourage those
states who do attempt to invade another state and initiate belligerent
occupations-whether as a result of a legitimate invocation of selfdefense or unlawful unilateralism-to plan in a manner that will enable
them to provide security to the occupied state sufficient to initiate the
anticipated reforms. As evidenced in Iraq, conducting elections and
instituting solitical and economic reforms are difficult in the midst of
hostilities. 9
It is acknowledged that the foregoing principles will be successful
only to the point that states adopt and implement them. After all, states
will be reticent to adhere to limitations imposed on an occupying power,
as they hitherto have been in regards to the traditional law of
occupation. Yet, this proposal has several identifiable benefits that make
it more likely that states will be more inclined to adhere to it.
First, these principles will reduce the ability of powerful states to coopt the United Nations for nefarious purposes, primarily because all
U.N. members will know the state of the law and the different
requirements that must be met for transformative occupations to
materialize. The upshot of this will be that smaller states will be more
inclined to publicly endorse the proposed jus post bellum, and larger
states-particularly those with proclivities toward unilateral
intervention-will exercise caution when realizing that unilateral
258. The CPA performed admirably in this regard.
259. Although, to be sure, much of the violence in Iraq did not commence until several
months after the United States initiated many of its reforms.
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intervention will not necessarily allow for a subsequent transformational
occupation that implements reforms sought by the invading state.
The foregoing principles will also reinforce the conservationist
principle and its application to regular occupations insofar as they will
apply only in transformational occupations, and when applied in
transformational occupations, they will uphold the central tenets of the
conservationist principle. This is especially important given the
uncertainty over the principle that has occurred as a result of the U.S.
occupation of Iraq. Thus, the proposed principles ofjus post bellum will
serve to reinforce the conservationist principle and vice versa.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposed principles of jus
post bellum will clearly articulate the rights available to the rightholders in regular and transformative occupations prior to unilateral or
multilateral invasions. Skeptics will be quick to point out that the
foregoing principles, had they been implemented prior to 2003, may
have made little difference in the occupation of Iraq, primarily because
America's determination to depose Saddam, to locate and neutralize
weapons of mass destruction, and to "democratize" Iraq were of such
paramount importance to America as to justify the attendant violation of
international law. However, had the Iraqis had a clear understanding of
their rights under occupation law, the United States would have likely
exercised greater caution in executing its transformational agenda
because the Iraqis' resistance to the reforms would have been arguably
more pronounced than otherwise indicated in the IGC minutes and
resolutions.
As evidenced by the IGC minutes and resolutions, the IGC-as well
as most Iraqis-were unaware of the full extent of their rights during
the occupation of Iraq. 260 Had the IGC been advised of the inherent
right of popular sovereignty afforded to Iraqis, they may have been
much more insistent that certain reforms be scaled back or altered, and
more forceful in articulating their role as stewards of Iraqi sovereignty.
This may have given more legitimacy to the plethora of otherwise
positive reforms initiated by the CPA. At a minimum, this fourth point
will more effectively outline the rights of occupied peoples during
occupation, thereby giving right-holders more leverage in the postconflict period, encouraging more transparency in the occupation
process, and providing a deterrent to unilateral invasion and occupation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The IGC minutes and resolutions demonstrate that the CPA often
260. Indeed, nothing in the minutes or resolutions forcefully speak to the fact that the IGC
was aware of its rights under international law.
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contravened its obligations under the international law of occupation by
implementing a transformational agenda in Iraq with only token
deference to the IGC or Iraqis themselves. The IGC minutes suggest
that, in practice, the IGC was an advisory body to the CPA, not the
representative of Iraqi sovereignty. Although it appears that the IGC
was not totally aware of its rights under the law of occupation,2 6' the
IGC minutes and resolutions reveal that the IGC opposed certain CPA
reforms and the manner in which certain reforms were instituted.
Given Iraq's incorporation of many of the CPA's orders and
regulations, 262* it may be said that Iraq has acquiesced to the
transformational agenda implemented by the United States. In any case,
there is little doubt that the status of the law of occupation today is
uncertain. 2 63 Although the occupation of Iraq could potentially set a
precedent for transformational occupations in the future, the proximity
to the Iraq experience prevents conclusory analysis for the time being.
However, in our age of 'humanitarian' and 'democratic' interventions,
the 'war against terror,' U.N. sponsored 'regime change' and 'nationbuilding' for 'failed' or 'outlaw' states, and the prolonged and highly
transformative foreign occupations that all of these tend to entail," the
need for a clear legal paradigm for international transformative

261. To be sure, Bremer was at times forceful with the IGC, encouraging them to rise to
the occasion and assume leadership over the transitional process. 2004 IGC Minutes, supra note
99,1108.
262. On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred full sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim
Government, and the CPA ceased to exist. MALLAT, supra note 69, at 29. Following the
adoption of the new Constitution in 2005 and the transfer of authority from the transitional
government to the Government of Iraq in 2006, many wondered whether the CPA legal
instruments remained valid law. FLORIAN AMERELLER ET AL., LEGAL GUIDE To DOING BUSINESS
IN IRAQ 3 (5th ed. 2010). The Constitution of Iraq does not refer explicitly to CPA Orders or
Regulations, but Article 130 of the Constitution perpetuates the validity of existing laws,
"presumably including CPA Orders that were not rescinded by the Interim and Transitional
Governments." Id. Since 2006, the GOI has expressly repealed certain CPA Orders, such as
Order 39, which was repealed by the new Investment Law (2006). See Zahawi, supra note 3, at
2329 (CPA Orders remained valid as a whole until and only if repealed by the GOI). Many CPA
Orders have also been officially incorporated by the GOI, most of which relate to economic
matters. Among the CPA Orders related to economic matters in Iraq that remain valid are Order
54 (Trade Liberalization Policy, amended per Order 70), Order 56 (Central Bank Law), Order
64 (Amendment to Iraqi Company Law No. 21 of 1997), Order 74 (Interim Law on Securities
Markets), Order 80 (Amendment to the Trademarks and Descriptions Law No. 21 of 1957),
Order 81 (Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Information, Integrated Circuits and Plant
Variety Law), and Order 94 (Banking Law of 2004). See CPA Official Documents, THE
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ regulations/#Orders (last
visited Nov. 11, 2012). Thus, in addition to pre-Saddam and Saddam-era legislation, the current
Iraqi legal framework includes several CPA Orders.
263. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 9
(2006).
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occupations has never been greater.264
This Article has sought to further refine the parameters of this
paradigm, and in this regard supplements the existing literature on the
jus post bellum law of transformative occupations. Relying on the
minutes and resolutions of the Iraqi Governing Council, this Article has
argued that the conservationist principle is as relevant today as when it
was codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva
Convention, and Additional Protocols I and II. What is needed today is
not a revision of the conservationist principle, but a modification of its
application to transformative occupations, where the conservationist
principle and its corollary doctrine of popular sovereignty must be
integrated with the equally important mandate of upholding basic
human rights.
To this end, this Article proposes three principles that ought to
govern transformative occupations under jus post bellum. They are: (1)
the military command of the occupying state should be separate and
distinct from a multinational civilian command; (2) this multinational
civilian command should be headed by an executive council composed
of citizen representatives from the occupied state, who, as the de facto
sovereign, may authorize transformative reforms;. and, (3) the
multinational civilian command should refrain, where possible, from
enacting reforms until all major hostilities have ceased.
By proposing principles to guide the development ofjus post bellum,
in no way does this Article seek to undermine the positive contributions
made by the United States in Iraq, not only during the first year of CPA
governance, but throughout the subsequent years of U.S. involvement in
Iraq. The minutes themselves speak of these contributions.265 Most Of
the reforms proposed and implemented by the United States were no
doubt necessary. However, the manner in which those reforms were
implemented should give scholars and policy makers pause given the
concomitant implications for future occupations.
Indeed, not all occupiers are innocent bedfellows, and, as indicated
by the IGC resolutions and minutes, even positive reforms can have
lingering repercussions on effective self-governance. At the core of the
proposed principles to guide a jus post bellum law for transformative
occupations is the notion that self-governance is most effective when
overseen by those whose interests are most at stake. Although selfgovernance does not always-at least initially-equate to effective
governance, international proclivities toward intervention should be
tempered by the conservationist principle, applied in post-conflict
264. Cohen, supra note 23, at 498.
265. The author is familiar with many of these contributions from first-hand experience,
having conducted dozens of ethnographic research missions in Iraq in 2008 and 2009 as an
embedded civilian Social Scientist with the U.S. Army's Ist Armored Division.
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occupations under the advisorship of citizen representatives of the
occupied state.
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